



Recent turmoil in China has riveted world
attention. Both the scope and the passion of the
pbpulatprotest have surprised observers. Even a
casual visitor to the country would agree that
economic reform in China during the last ten
years has brought about striking improvements in
the standard of living. So why has there been so
much apparent popular disenchantment, despite
these impressive economic successes?
This Letter seeks to throw light on this question
by examining the accomplishments and defects
of the economic reform in China over the past
decade. Although not all political upheavals have
economic roots, in this case, economic factors
seem to have played a central role.
At the macroeconomic level, accelerating
inflation in recent years reflects a lack of effective
monetary and fiscal policies, which in turn, can
be attributed to some basic defects in the present
institutional framework. On a microeconomic
level, the widespread corruption, which both the
government and the populace recognize as an
unacceptable social evil, is a symptom of struc-
tural deficiencies in the nation's distributive
system.
No matter how the current political turmoil is
settled, China will have to face up to the funda-
mental defects of the economic reform that lie
at the root of the turmoil. At this juncture, the
policymakers in China can choose either to pre-
serve the nation's present institutional framework
and revert to the tightly-controlled command
economy of pre-reform days, or institute sweep-
ing structural reforms that will regain the forward
momentum of economic reform which has be-
stowed considerable benefits on China in the
past ten years.
Accomplishments of economic reform
Broadly speaking, China's economic reform has
proceeded in two stages. During the first stage,
from 1979 to 1984, reform focused on the rural
area, where 80 percent ofthe population resided.
By leasing land to farmers and letting farmers
J
decide what to grow, and by increasing the
official purchase prices of farm products, the
reform released productive initiative and energy
formerly dammed up in the rural communes.
Farm output increased so rapidly that for a few
years, until consumption caught up, granaries
were bulging with surplus grains. Even more
remarkably, rural industrial development caught
on like wild fire, producing a wide range of light
industrial and consumer products. Rural indus-
tries soon became the most dynamic sector of
the Chinese economy.
In 1984, the leaders began a comprehensive
program of urban industrial reform to reduce the
scope of economic planning, grant enterprises
substantial autonomy in managing their busi-
nesses, and open the economy to foreign trade
and foreign investment. Where the state had
taken all the profits and covered all the losses
before, the reform allowed enterprises to retain
after-tax profits and held them responsible for
their losses. Where capital investments had been
financed by the state treasury before, the reform
forced enterprises to seek bank loans and pay
interest. Where workers had been paid fixed
wages regardless of enterprise profitability, the
reform allowed enterprises to pay workers
bonuses out of retained earnings.
Overall, reform in China has achieved impressive
results. Since 1980, national income has grown at
an average 10 percent annual rate. The standard
of living has risen markedly, as the quantity,
variety, and quality of consumer goods have all
improved. Goods such as refrigerators, color
televisions, and washing machines, previously
considered luxury items, are now available and
accessible to many households.
Defects in reform program
Economic reform has brought mixed blessings,
however. Foremost among the problems it has
created is rampant inflation. Economic reform
has enriched the countryside and enabled urban
enterprises to give workers lavish bonuses and
undertake extravagant investment projects. ThisFRBSF
rise in spending power has led to rising expec-
tations about living standards. But, because it
has been fueled by unrestrained bank lending to
enterprises and rapid growth of the money sup-
ply, the reform has given more spending power to
people than the growth in output could support.
(See thisLetter, November 4,1988.)
Coupled with the easing of price controls, this
rapid growth in spending power has caused in-
flation to accelerate. According to official data,
retail prices rose 6 percent in 1986, 7 percent in
1987,18 percent in 1988, and during the first four
months of1989, retail prices were 27 percent
above their level a year ago. These inflation rates
are not high by other developing countries' stan-
dards. However, China's per capita income still is
relatively low, and certain structural features
peculiar to China have made inflation harder
to toleratethan in other countries.
In the first place, wage rigidity is much more
pervasive in China than elsewhere. The govern-
ment accounts for a far larger proportion of total
employment. Strapped by budget deficits year
after year, the government has not been able to
raise the pay of civil servants, school teachers,
hospital workers, and retired persons fast enough
to keep up with the pace of inflation. Moreover,
despite economic reform, enterprises' "wage
funds" are tightly regulated by the government.
When the authorities decided last September
to clamp down on bank credit and enterprise
spending in a strong bid to keep inflation under
control, even thebonuses of workers in profit-
able enterprises began to dry up.
Compoundingthe problems caused by wage
rigidity is an almost total lack of.labor mobility.
Workers, whether in government or enterprise
employment, cannot change jobs withouttheir
employers' consent. This generates deep frus-
tration and resentment in those who are caught
between rising pricesand slowly-adjusting
wages, with little freedom to change jobs.
Another popular complaint has been widespread
corruption. The government not only recognizes
the problem, but also has in recent years insti-
tuted vigorous measuresto stamp out corruption,
including setting up channels for citizens to
identify corrupt officials anonymously. Thus far,
however, the measures have not been effective.
The roots of corruption inChina are no different
than in any other country in which economic
activity is regulated by government officials. The
greater the scarcity of resources and the more
rigid the price controls, the greater is the poten-
tial for corruption. And in China, despite the
proclaimed goal of taking the government out
of business decisions, essentially the same eco-
nomic planning structure as before regulates
prices, restricts labor mobility, approves bank
credits, and decides who gets what and how
mucnessential, scarce inputs, such as energy,
transport, raw materials, parts, and components.
Prior to reform, under conditions of generalized
poverty, corruption was virtually non-existent.
Ostentatious living was too easily detected and
generally frowned upon. In contrast, economic
reform has shifted emphasis to material work in-
centives and made display of wealth acceptable
and even fashionable. This change in values has
combined with increased access to (::onsumer
goods and continued bureaucratic control over
economic activity to reinforce a tendency for
corruption.
Roots of the defects
Both inflation and corruption are symptoms.
Their roots lie deep in a tentative, piecemeal
approach to reform that has characterized
China's economic reform from its very beginning.
Granted, the scope of China's economic reform
has been unprecedented among socialist coun-
tries, and its purported transformation from a
Soviet-type command economy to one in which
market forces playa crucial role involves far'
more drastic changes than any other economy
has attempted in so short a time. In a funda-
mental sense, China has been trying to break
new ground, and its cautious step-by-step ap-
proachis entirely understandable. Nevertheless,
the result has been reform without a blueprint to
ensure internal consistency. Moreover, as the ex-
periences of other countries have shown, partial
reform often creates more problems than it
solves.
In China's case, economic reform was meant
simultaneously to increase economic efficiency
and to preserve social stability. However, in
China's institutional structure, "social stability"
has a special meaning that is absent in market
economies. Workers in China are dependent onthe enterprises and government units that employ
them, not only for their salaries and wages, but
also for the provision of housing and medical
care. Under these circumstances, allowing an
unprofitable enterprise to fail or a redundant
government unit to be closed entails serious
social disruption beyond the lost jobs. The
authorities thus have been driven to minimize
structural changes in government and enterprise
management. Although government agencies
have been converted into government corpora-
tions, and greater autonomy has been given to
enterprises, their management style has not
broken away from the lackadaisical approach
which characterized government and enterprise
management prior to reform.
The inability or reluctance to let enterprises fail
has had serious implications for the conduct of
fiscal and monetary policies. Fiscal policy has
been hampered by the need to prop up failing
enterprises through tax reductions and direct
subsidies, and monetary policy has been weak-
ened by the need to support unprofitable
enterprises through bank loans.
Prior to reform, responsibility for macroeconomic
stabilization rested with the fiscal authorities.
Through tight budget control over all spending
units, aggregate demand was adjusted to balance
aggregate supply. Banks were subservient to the
planning (fiscal) authorities, carrying out purely
"cashier" functions. Economic reform eased
budgetary controls on enterprises, and trans-
ferred the responsibility for enterprise financing,
and ultimately, macroeconomic stabilization, to
the banking system. The banking system, how-
ever, has not had the staff nor the authority to
carry out an effective monetary policy in the new
environment. As a result, inflation has become a
serious problem.
Moreover, fear of accelerating inflation has
increased the government's reluctance to relax
price controls. These price controls may, to some
extent, keep a lid on price increases arising from
excessive demand pressures, but they also pre-
vent necessary relative price adjustments. In an
attempt to ensure the supply of "essential"
goods and services to consumers at "tolerable"
prices, needed price reform has been held back.
As a result, the supply ofthese "essential" goods
and services has become more scarce than
would have been the case if their prices had
been allowed to rise, providing incentives to
increase production of these goods and services.
Alternative scenarios
Thus, despite its many outstanding achieve-
ments, economic reform in China has a number
of serious defects, the roots of which can be
traced to the lack of an overall, integrated blue-
print that could simultaneously ensure social
stability and improve economic efficiency. The
result has been a partial economic reform that
has satisfied neither goal. The choice before the
authorities is, therefore, either return to rigid
control of the command economy that existed
prior to reform, or institute further reform that
would ensure price stability and allow market
signals fully to determine the allocation of scarce
resources.
The perils of restoring rigid controls are clear
from China's own past experience as well as
those of other socialist economies. Economic
incentives would sag, and economic stagnation
return. At the same time, foreign trade and
foreign investment would decline precipitously,
which means that technological progress, on
which China's modernization has depended,
would be retarded.
However, the alternative course of fundamental
reform is not an easy one, either. Obviously, it is
much easier to identify defects than to recom-
mend remedies. Nevertheless, it seems safe to
say that any such reform must permit enterprises
to fail and allow workers to change jobs, without
jeopardizing access to housing and medical care.
It also should ensure that effective monetary and
fiscal policies are implemented to restrain infla-
tionary pressures, and that price reforms are
undertaken to ease scarcities that arise from a
distorted price structure.
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